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Foreword 
This Working Paper is a summary of a workshop which was held a t  the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria on 26-28 June 1992. 
Small scale privatization (SSP) of shops, restaurants and other consumer services has been 
accomplished in the first stage of the complex process of privatization in Eastern Europe. It 
was also an experiment for measuring the demand for previously state owned property and for 
verifying different techniques of privatization. The Russian Federation is now undertaking the 
first steps in SSP and may learn much from recent experiences of the other East European 
economies. In order t o  facilitate such an exchange, a workshop was organized at  IIASA t o  
analyze the pattern of SSP in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the former East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, and Russia. The characteristics a t  each stage of the privatization processes 
were thoroughly discussed and compared across the nations, beginning with the emergence of the 
idea of SSP, through legislation and the rise of unexpected tensions during the implementation 
phase, to the characteristic features of newly privatized retail and service businesses. 
Sincere thanks go to  all the scientists and policy experts who contributed greatly to the 
success of this workshop. It proved to  be both a unique and useful intellectual exchange regarding 
a very practical issue, especially for those nations with substantial privatization still to be 
undertaken. Gratitude is extended to the Japan Foundation for its financial support of this 
venture. 
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1. Introduction 
-
Small-scale privatization (SSP) is an integral part of the transition to a 
market economy in the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
Russian Federated Republic (RFR or Russia). Throughout these nations a 
predominant hope has prevailed that SSP would constitute the fastest, easiest and 
most welcomed part of the complex privatization process and additionally serve as 
a catalyst for the development of a wide cohort of entrepreneurs. These virtues of 
SSP were expected to be a major contribution t o  the evolution of competition, the 
unfolding of a market economy and the balancing of the hardships the population 
must endure as a consequence of the crisis accompanying the process of transition. 
While small scale privatization is still in its very infancy in Russia, it is well 
under way or close to completion in the former socialist countries of the 
neighboring West. The smaller East European economies differ in terms of their 
initial conditions, privatization legislation, techniques employed in SSP, the level 
of public content with the results of SSP, and other factors. Consequently the 
study of these issues could be beneficial for the advancement of SSP in the 
Russian Federation. 
The potential to benefit from and assess the applicability of the experiences 
of Central and Eastern European countries motivated the Committee for the 
Management of State Property of the RFR to ask IIASA to organize a workshop 
that leading officials from the responsible agencies for SSP from these smaller 
countries would attend. As a result, top officials and experts from the Ministry of 
Privatization of Poland, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the State Property 
Agency of Hungary, the Ministry of Administration and Privatization of the Slovak 
Republic, German, Polish, and Hungarian economic research institutes, and IIASA 
gathered in Laxenburg in late June 1992. They met with the department chiefs 
from the Russian Committee for the Management of State Property of the RFR 
designated by Anatoly Chubais, Deputy Prime Minister of the RFR and Chairman 
of the Committee. 
The meeting was characterized by a very open exchange concerning the 
individual nations' experiences in small scale privatization. The combination of 
leading policy-makers with hands-on experience and research scholars specialized 
in background material and analysis of results proved to be a useful mix of 
participants in an effort to achieve the balanced perspective on the topics of 
discussion. 
The accounts of the various national experts and ensuing discussions 
together form the intellectual basis for this up-to-date description of SSP in the 
CEE countries and Russia. The information we collected during this workshop has 
been complemented with background material (refer to the references) and with 
the information the authors acquired on their study trips to Budapest, Prague, 
Moscow, and Warsaw during 1991-1992. We wish to thank all the participants of 
the workshop for their valuable contributions. Their names and positions are 
listed in the Appendix. Other contributions notwithstanding, views or opinions 
expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent 
those of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis or of its National 
Member Organizations. Any omissions or errors remain those of the authors. 
The structure of this report more or less follows that of the workshop. Each 
session provided information on the particular topic of SSP on the agenda in each 
East European economy and Russia. The purpose of this organization is to 
facilitate a representative account of the progress and effects of SSP in the various 
nations and to finally summarize the relevant experiences for a nation just 
embarking on this simplest form of privatization. 
2. Emergence of the Idea of SSP - Principles, Legislation and 
-
Techniques of Small Scale Privatization 
2 2  The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
SSP legislation was approved on 1 October 1990 (The Law on the Transfer 
of State Property and Some Goods to Other Juristic or Natural Persons). The 
legislation defined small scale privatization by two features: the business to be 
privatized would not carry on any obligation of the previous owner (debt, other 
obligations like training apprentices, etc.), and the only method to be used was to 
be the auction. The legislation did not define the maximum value or activity of 
a particular unit to be privatized under SSP. Thus, any type of retail, wholesale, 
and even manufacturing enterprise could have been privatized under the 
guidelines of the SSP program. The largest items sold in the course of 
Czechoslovakian SSP exceeded a value of CSK 100 Million (USD 3-4 Million). 
The auction was seen as the most transparent method for unbiased 
distribution. I t  allowed some adjustment if the original assessment of the value 
of the unit to be privatized turned out to be unrealistic. The auction was also 
regarded as a method that was most infallible in terms of corruptibility. 
The ultimate decision power in SSP was in the hands of the Ministry of 
Privatization. Privatization commissions were formed in every district, in 
Slovakia for instance there were 38 such districts. Each commission made a list 
of businesses to  be auctioned. The municipalities and local governments were 
advising on the inclusion or exception of particular businesses. The managers of 
the business were obligated by law to make all the necessary data regarding the 
enterprise available within 30 days. After the lists were discussed with the local 
authorities and branch ministries, the Ministry of Privatization had to give final 
approval. The commission was responsible for publishing the list in mass media 
a t  least 30 days before the auction. Auction participants were required to pay a 
fee for participation and a deposit refindable 10% of starting price or CSK 10,000 
(USD 300-350) to take part in the auction. The price determined in the auction 
had to be paid 30 days thereafter. 
During the preparations for the SSP some general principles were followed 
to preclude the emergence of a monopolized private retail trade. Giant retail trade 
companies responsible for the supply of whole counties were split up to several 
smaller units, while wholesale activity of these companies was concentrated to one 
of the new units created from the old company. 
The basis for small scale privatization in the CSFR did not rest on the goal 
to achieve the highest possible price or returns from SSP. The true objective was 
simply to reduce state ownership and to create an indigenous business class. This 
is why legal persons founded in the previous socialist system (like state owned 
enterprises) were precluded from participating in the auctions and also foreign 
(physical or legal) persons were allowed to enter in the second round of auctions 
only, that is, if the first auction for a given unit turned out to be unsuccesshl. 
Auctions were carried out by independent committees. The auctions were 
divided into two groups depending on the character of the items: 
1. The whole entity, including land and buildings; and 
2. Enterprises located within the building, that were not the property 
of the building owner. In this case, the inventory and equipment was 
auctioned, not the level of the rent. The winner of the auction had 
then obtained the right to make an agreement with the owner of the 
building for two years (in October 1991 extended to an obligatory five 
years) rental agreement. 
If the auctions were faced by a lack of demand, then the law allowed the 
modification of the auction to the 'Dutch-clock' form, in which the initial price 
could be successively reduced. In the first round prices could be reduced to 50% 
of the original price by increments of 10%. In case the first round did not result 
in a sale, a second round followed in which prices could be allowed to decline to 
20% of the original price. The only limiting condition for a Dutch-clock auction was 
that a t  least five persons had to take part in this event. Out of the 15,000 to 
19,000 auctions in the process of SSP, about 1500 had to be concluded through the 
Dutch manner. 
Tradition made it dimcult to determine the appropriate method to identify 
the most reasonable calling price. Originally, the depreciated value of buildings 
and equipment was simply used. The distorted pricing system under communism 
rendered this system as inadequate. In May 1991, a special decree was passed on 
how to compute the prices of businesses. Two multiplier coefficients, based on the 
original price of buildings and machinery and on the year of privatization (the 
age), were used. After some months, the coefficients were thought to be too low, 
leading to  their increase in late 1991. This intervention later turned out to be 
excessive because the price of real estate was then above the market value making 
it difficult to sell. 
The revenue from SSP is kept separate from the state budget for anti- 
inflationary reasons. In the one and a half years before June 1992, 14 billion 
Krones were earned as a result of privatization. Some of these revenues have 
been used for the privatization process. 
During the preparation of the privatization law many employees of to-be- 
privatized enterprises requested exceptions and special preferences. The request 
for closed rounds of auctions, restricted solely to employee participation, was one 
of the most popular among them. As for additional pressure, trade unions 
threatened with industrial actions and strikes. While the governments were 
divided on the issues, eventually both the stronger part of the three governments 
(ministers of economic affairs in the Czech, Slovak and Federal government) and 
the Parliament rejected the granting of any preferences for the employees of the 
units t o  be privatized in the SSP. 
2.2 Former East Germany 
After World War 11, East Germany was still a center of flourishing private 
enterprise, particularly in retail trade, services, and light industry. In 1950, this 
sector employed 42% of the work force and accounted for 31% of GNP. However, 
by the early 1970s it had, for all intents and purposes, been eliminated. Most of 
the small and medium sized businesses had been absorbed into the oversized 
administrative, integrated enterprise organizations called Kombinate. In 1989, the 
private sector produced only 3% of GNP, but was still most active in retail trade 
and services. 
We need not emphasize that the German process of privatization is a very 
special one. The legislation that was required to facilitate the realization of SSP 
was essentially a h c t i o n  of the unification process of the two Germanies in 1990. 
Firstly, this encompassed the monetary union with West Germany and the 
acceptance of the general laws and business practices fiom West Germany, and 
secondly, the establishment of the trust agency called Treuhandanstalt. The 
Treuhand was actually established by the still communist government on 1 March 
1990 as a trust company and was transformed to a state holding company t o  
manage and ultimately privatize state property by a modification of the first law 
on 17 June 1990. 
Initially all state property was transferred to  the Treuhand, which in turn 
changed the existing enterprises to either joint stock companies or limited liability 
companies. After dealing with some complications involving restitution problems, 
a speedy SSP program was introduced. 
Restitution was a major obstacle for East German privatization. 
Privatization was seriously hindered by unresolved problems of restitution until 
late March 1991 when the so-called speed-up law, which modified 11 existing laws, 
130 regulations, and a new law and 62 new regulations were introduced. These 
new regulations made it possible to compensate previous owners by cash rather 
than by original property. 
In the area of the former German Democratic Republic the decisions to  put 
property up for auction were made by commissions. These commissions were 
made up of local government persons, other state officials, and members of the 
Treuhand. 
The Treuhand was dealing with all properties of the 126 giant Kombimte 
(integrated enterprises containing small and medium-sized firms) and over 2,000 
retail enterprises belonging to local authorities. Generally, the SSP was 
undertaken by regional offices of the Treuhand, while only the largest units were 
handled by the head-office. 
The privatization actually could proceed top-down and bottom-up. The 
latter method was facilitated by the introduction of the so-called "Split-up Law" 
(division of vertically integrated enterprises into profit centers), while the former 
was operationalized by the establishment of as many as 5,000 boards of directors 
consisting mostly of West German managers. This process created the units for 
small-scale as well as large-scale privatization. After privatization, Treuhand 
guarantees loans to new enterprises and aids in financing with banks. 
Competitive (sealed) bidding campaigns (also referred to as investment 
contests) were organized for shops up to 100 m2 and restaurantslpubs up to 160 
m2. These competitions were published in regional and inter-regional newspapers 
only one week before the auction. The purpose was to indirectly restrict access to 
outsiders. (There were no direct restrictions on foreign or West German capital in 
place.) As a consequence, 80% of the businesses were sold to native East Germans. 
In the service sector, though, many services were simply taken over by the 
communities (i.e., transportation, health care facilities, etc.). In the process of SSP, 
the task and obligation to take over the type of activity and maintain the existing 
employees were transferred to the new owner. 
Until the end of the 1980s, retail trade in Hungary was characterized by a 
dominance of large trade networks owned by the state or cooperatives. They were 
in a quasi-monopoly position on the markets of certain product groups or in 
certain regions. 
In spite of these networks, the importance of private shops also grew most 
significantly during the last decade. By 1990, the share of private shops reached 
56% in terms of the total number of shops and 20% in terms of total retail trade 
turnover. The number of private trade companies also radically increased: by 
1988 their number was almost 3,000 and their share in the total trade turnover 
was 1.5%. 
On the initiative of the government, a great number of outlets of the large 
retail trade networks was contracted out or leased to private entrepreneurs from 
the early 1980s onward. This system had several advantages; namely, as a 
consequence of the profit-motivation of the renters the supply of products in the 
shops and the level of their senices improved. However, the strange situation 
developed that a growing part of the revenues of the state owned trade networks 
originated from the rents paid by the entrepreneurs. The centers of many of these 
networks seemed to become sheer parasites, collecting an additional rent over the 
one that had to be paid to the owners of the premises, the local authorities. The 
system reached its peak in 1989, when the trade turnover of the shops in leasing 
form (contractual or rented) exceeded the turnover of the shops, functioning in 
traditional form. 
The inefficiency of this system sooner or later gave rise to the idea that the 
original companies should be abolished by splitting up into shops and so enabling 
the potential entrepreneurs to rent the shops directly from local authorities. 
By officially discussing this idea, Hungary was, in fact, the first of the small 
Eastern European countries where SSP was put on the agenda of economic reform. 
However, for different reasons, Hungary's program turned out to be the least 
ambitious and the tardiest in the region both in its objectives and its 
implementation. The reason for this partly lay in the substantial and growing 
private sector in Hungarian retail trade and senices by 1989. 
In 1989, the original idea of the SSP led to much controversy. The major 
argument against it, expressed mostly by managers having vested interest in the 
old form of state retail networks, was that cutting the networks into pieces would 
put the shops into a defenseless position vis-a-vis their suppliers, the huge state 
industrial enterprises. 
The SSP law was finally adopted in August 1990, entered into force at  the 
end of September, and the program actually started a t  the end of that year. One 
of the reasons why this SSP law was eventually adopted and called the Pre- 
Privatization Law (indicating the type of privatization that must precede other 
privatization programs) was the recognition of both the government and the 
deputies of parliament that without an urgently needed immediate step forward, 
wild and spontaneous privatization would make SSP soon meaningless. As a 
matter of fact, between the summer of 1989 and August of 1990, in the phase of 
the so-called spontaneous privatization, several huge trade companies were 
transformed into limited liability companies and formed joint ventures with 
foreign companies. Many of the managers of these state companies made major 
efforts to arrange a very rapid - complete or partial - transformation of their 
company because they feared that the introduction of the SSP would lead to a 
break-up of their original firm. This run for transformation - based on other laws 
like the Company Act, Act on Foreign Investments (both of 1988) and the 
Transition Act (1989) - meant that by the time the SSP program started, a great 
number of shops no longer conformed to the definitions of the SSP Law. In fact, 
many of the most valuable shops were already sold, and the ensuing revenues had 
been invested in a way the state could not make use of them anymore. 
The SSP law put the SSP program under the control of the State Property 
Agency (SPA). This law covered businesses, workshops, and consumer related 
s e ~ c e s  fimctioning already on lease or on other contractual basis. 'Small scale' 
was defined by the number of staff, not exceeding 10 in retail trade outlets and 
less than 15 in catering trade establishments. In the case of hotel trade, consumer 
related services and petrol stations, small scale was defined by a limit regarding 
the turnover of the unit. 
The units were to be sold at auctions: the initial price had to be determined 
by the SPA. The price was the main and only criteria of winning in the auction. 
The general principle of Hungarian privatization practices is the sale of 
businesses for real values rather than giving them away for free, even at the 
expense of more rapid privatization. While this principle has been challenged 
many times in the last few years, modifications of the procedures helped only a 
little in speeding up different programs of privatization. One such recent 
modification in SSP, which we will elaborate later, reveals the possibilities for a 
major group of shops to avoid auctioning. 
There are no conditions in the privatization program that call for granting 
preferences of previous leasers or employees of the outlet, except for a minor 
qualification in case of equal bidding, the previous leaser and employees enjoy 
priority. 
In an effort to speed-up SSP, Hungarian policy-makers decided early that 
claims for 111 restitution of previous owners will not be entertained. The principle 
of compensation that was accepted by the parliament much later than the SSP law 
(namely, in the middle of 1991) states that previous owners are compensated for 
their nationalized property to a certain extent only with and in the form of bills 
of restitution. These bills can be utilized in limited ways, bidding for outlets in 
auctions included. 
In some cases (in the case of food-stores, bookstores, etc.), the new ownerlrenter 
had to guarantee that the profile of the shops will be maintained for a certain 
period of time. In the majority of cases not the ownership right, but only the right 
to rent for 10 years was sold. Outlets covered by the SSP could only be sold to  
Hungarian citizens, foreigners were not permitted to take part in the auctions. 
The legislation also permitted retail outlets to be auctioned several times. 
An auction is defined as unsuccessful if the expected value determined by the 
State Property Agency is not reached. In such a case, the unit would be re- 
auctioned in a so-called simplified auction, to which only the most serious bidders 
are invited. 
2.4 Poland 
After 1947, the communist takeover effectively suppressed and destroyed 
private retail trade and consumer services in Poland. This major event of Polish 
history had reverberations throughout the next forty years as reflected in the 
waves of centralization and decentralization of trade; the last minor 
decentralization campaign being initiated in 1981. 
The private sector's share in Polish retail trade, however, started to increase 
substantially only in 1989, before the wave of SSP. This growth was partly a 
response to liberalization measures making it possible for citizens to start new 
businesses and partly a reaction to the huge shortages of consumer goods in state 
shops. The number of retail trade outlets jumped to 72,000 fi-om the previous 
year's 43,000, not to  mention the tens of thousands of unregistered vendors 
conducting business in city streets and squares. 
Small scale privatization of existing state outlets started in early 1990 and 
gained a momentum in the middle of that year. SSP in Poland has not been 
guided by a single, specific act. Accordingly in order to understand the pattern of 
events one must refer to several acts, as well as to the major turn in 
macroeconomic control and economic policy initiated in Poland early January 1990. 
Polish SSP refers to those 100,000 businesses, mostly shops and consumer 
services, wholesale and retail trade enterprises where the founding organ was 
typically the mayor or the municipal council of the locality. The legal status of 
these municipalities was formed by three major events in 1990. F'irst, free local 
elections were conducted on 27 May. Second, on the same day municipalities 
obtained a legal identity and limited financial independence. They were also 
granted the property rights over business premises (land, building lots, shops, 
restaurants, apartments) as well as those of about 1,600 companies. This meant 
that the long-standing agreements between the owner of the space (most 
frequently the community) and the user (one of the several hundred large 
enterprises) had been canceled. The owner of a building, the local authorities, 
could then independently decide and negotiate with potential renters. The third 
important event was the "Act on Local Self-Government" adopted in May 1990. 
This bill finished the formation of an independent local owner capable of initiating 
and controlling a fully decentralized process of small-scale privatization. 
In fact, this is the most important characteristic feature of the Polish SSP: 
the extremely decentralized and unregulated manner that was coupled with a 
relatively fast pace of the privatization. 
Two additional laws enhanced the unfolding of the small scale privatization 
process: the "Act on Economic Activity" (effective early 1989), and the "Housing 
Act" (June 1990). The first of these two acts granted the right to set up a business 
for each citizen without the need to obtain special pennits or licences, while the 
second excluded trade outlets, like shops from the special renting mode in which 
rents had been set centrally, by the Council of Ministers. 
In addition to this legal framework the federal government only made 
recommendations on a limited basis to the local authorities in charge of 
privatization. This lack of central control resulted in a remarkably large variation 
of how local authorities arranged the privatization of the outlets they had 
possessed. Even if some regularities have emerged in the process of privatizing the 
several tens of thousand of outlets under the auspices of the 2,700 municipalities 
(like the overwhelming dominance of lease privatization over outright sale or the 
scarcity of unrestricted auctions), these were more the result of implicit legal 
constraints or social relations than of any explicit central regulation or directive. 
2.5 Russia 
Russia is a unique nation in many ways. In Russia, there is practically no 
living memory of small entrepreneurship as there was in the other Central and 
East European economies. Private trade was virtually eliminated in Russia a 
quarter of a century or more before i t  was done in the other CEE nations. 
Correspondingly, central distribution has its deepest roots in Russia. One of the 
greatest obstacles to the implementation and success of small-scale privatization 
in the RFR is a direct result of the aforementioned factors; namely, the psychology 
of the population. 
The actual process of small scale privatization began in early 1992. 
Although several occasional auctions were registered in various parts of Russia 
during 1990-1991, since then the process was chiefly motivated, initiated and 
directed by the central government of the Russian Federal Republic (RFR). A 
number of decrees signed by President Boris Yeltsin since November 1991 had 
facilitated the key breakthrough to realizing privatization procedures. These 
included: 
"Foundations of the State Program of Privatization for the Year 1992"; 
"On Commercialization of Trade': 
"On Commercialization of Consumer Related Services': and, 
"On Freedom of Trade". 
In addition, the Supreme Soviet (Council) of the RFR had passed the act 
"On Separation of State and Municipal Property" on December 27, 1991. This 
decree was essential for the reorganization of trade controlled by large industrial 
ministries and opened the door for regional privatization committees to actively 
begin privatization. Since then, small scale privatization became Mly legitimate 
and received true legal status in Russia and, more importantly, the strong support 
of central authorities. 
In late 1991 and early 1992, the start of commercialization1 and the 
ensuing liberalization of retail trade created an appropriate environment for the 
beginning of mass small scale privatization. In fact, until as recently as the 
middle of April 1992, half of the retail trade and consumer related services outlets 
in Russia were still not commercialized. In addition to possessing no separate 
assets, balance sheets, or bank accounts, these outlets were also not legal 
entities2. At that time, between 40% and 60% of all retail trade and service 
outlets in Russia were still exclusively the property of one or another of the large 
regional trade monopolies. There had been 1,800 of these vast organizations in 
Russia, entirely controlling supplies, stocks, distribution, sales, finances and 
accounting of their retail branches. 
Among those outlets already commercialized, most are small and still 
largely depend on their former 'parentsJ due to the generally high level of 
monopolization of supply, storing and transport networks, not to speak of the 
inexperience of personnel and the infancy of banking infrastructures. 
Nevertheless, the ice was brokenJ and since then millions of people have tasted the 
spirit of small entrepreneurship as either consumer or sales agent. 
Mass small scale privatization in Russia officially began on 5 April, 1992, 
when local authorities successfully auctioned over 20 cafes, shops and other 
commercial retail outlets a t  the first regular auction in Nizhny Novgorod3. The 
International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank 
Group, has drawn from the lessons of Central and East European countries in 
order to design a unique privatization project in Russia's third largest city. 
Experts from Poland and the CSFR joined the international team. The plans were 
to sell 2,500 of the city's retail trade and services operations by the end of this 
year. 
Commercialization refers to an enterprise achieving the status of being financially and 
managerially independent. This definition, used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), also best 
corresponds to the meaning of the term in Russian. 
One must register to become a legal entity in Russia, otherwise one is considered a physical 
entity. The procedure is fairly complicated and time consuming. 
This city had been more commonly known as Gorky in the past. During the transition, it 
regained its historical name. According to the old Russian tradition, people often refer to it as Nizhny 
(meaning 'lower?. 
In an effort to equalize the vastly different rates and breadth of SSP among 
alternative regions, Russia was divided into 88 regions and a regional 
privatization committee was established in each one. In the initial phase of SSP 
there had been no true links between the central and the 88 regional committees. 
Due to inadequate results in the distribution, amount and speed of privatization, 
which was in part attributed to the lack of active ties between the regional and 
central committees, the former were subsequently directly subordinated to the 
Committee for the Management of State Property of the RFR in Moscow. Further 
reasoning behind this move was as a result of the premise that, in Russia today, 
the central government is acclaimed to be more progressive and reform oriented 
than the local authorities and committees. It is not too surprising that this has 
resulted in a very hierarchical structure, but the Committee has argued that the 
necessity for this lies in the need to speed up the process and reduce the influence 
of local 'apparatchiksy. 
According to the legislation, start-up prices of outlets are set at their book 
value in 1979 prices. As a consequence, and additionally due to the extensive 
investors' interest, selling prices of outlets were many times higher than the start- 
up prices. 
All over the country, an instance has yet to occur in which a foreign investor 
has bought outright a retail trade or services enterprise, despite the large number 
of foreign firms leasing hundreds of premises for retail trade, mostly in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg. Yet, present leasing agreements of these foreign firms do not 
automatically give them the rights to buy outlets once the leases expire. The 
participation of legal and physical entities from other republics of the former 
Soviet Union has also been very weak, although generally these people are not yet 
considered to be foreigners. 
Small scale privatization is not hindered by claims of restitution in Russia, 
as has been the case in most of the smaller Central/Eastern European nations. In 
Russia there are no grounds for restitution. Previous owners and their 
descendants died long ago, documentation was discarded and buildings were 
ruined. All over the country, only a few claims of former owners were registered, 
but none were even considered in a court of law. The legislation does not preserve 
the rights of former owners. 
On 5 June 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the RFR modified the one year-old 
law "On Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the RFR". As far as 
small scale privatization is concerned, auctions have become the dominant 
accepted procedure permitted for the sale of both insolvent and well-functioning 
enterprises. This should effectively put a halt to giving away enterprises to 
employees, which has become an all too popular strategy in several regions. The 
new version of the law also includes a package of anti-monopoly measures: for 
instance, it forbids mergers and acquisitions in the process of privatization, as well 
as termination of earlier existing legal entities. The changes have significantly 
strengthened the legislative power of the Committee for the Management of State 
Property. 
On June 11, the Supreme Soviet of the RFR has accepted "The State 
Program of Privatization for the Year 1992". This document has been issued 
within the framework set forth by Yeltsin's half a year old decree on the 
"Foundations of the State Program of Privatization for the Year 1992". The 
Program has not only confirmed mandatory privatization of the entire wholesale 
and retail trade and consumer related services in as short a period as feasible, but 
also included in this list units that currently belong to industrial ministries and 
large state enterprises4. 
The other important novelty in the program is that small enterprises with 
less than 200 employees and a book value on 1 January 1992 (in 1979 prices) of 
less than 1 million rubles can only be privatized via the auction method at this 
time. This attaches the quantitative criteria to the corresponding article of the 
legislation. While it may seem obscure the absolute majority of not only retail but 
also wholesale trade outlets satisfy these criteria. 
According to the estimates provided in the Program, the gross revenues of 
privatization in 1992 (including large scale privatization yet to  be started) will 
reach approximately 74 billion rubles, including 15 billion rubles from physical 
entities and 10 billion rubles from foreign investors. The Committee for the 
Management of State Property expects to essentially complete small-scale 
privatization in Russia by the middle of 1993. 
According to "The State Program of Privatization for the Year 1992", the 
following techniques of privatization are recognized: 
auctioning of enterprises; 
- investment contest with binding conditions (with mandatory 
competitive bidding at an a~ction)~; 
- non-commercial investment contest with regulated access6; 
Industrial ministies and large state enterprises directly own almost 100% of retail trade and 
consumer related services in certain areas, such as oil pumping and coal mining regions, metallurgy, 
and nuclear energy centers. These ministries and enterprises must now sell off their free-access retail 
shops and service units by the end of this year. The only exceptions are the shops located a t  oil wells, 
gold mines, and other very inaccessible locations. 
The binding conditions include one or (rarely) more of the following three: 
1. preservation of the former type of business, 
2. perpetuation of the employment of the persons previously working a t  
the outlet or enterprise, and 
3. obligation to invest. 
Such a contest i s  arranged primarily in rural areas and small cities, where the profile of the retail 
outlet is important for the population. The only participants allowed to bid are employees of the 
enterprise to be sold and residents (physical entities) living in the vicinity. 
  he only participants permitted to enter such a contest are those who are ready to provide 
necessary financial iqjections. The winner might not be the highest bidder, but the one who best 
satisfies the criteria of the competition. 
- auctioning of liquidated or insolvent enterprises; 
- buy-out of earlier leased property (without competitive bidding); and, 
- sale of shares of open joint stock companies. 
In addition to the first technique on the list, which has been the most 
frequently utilized instrument, the other privatization techniques have also begun 
functioning to a varied extent throughout parts of Russia. Since the bankruptcy 
legislation has not began to work on a full scale, there is not a large number of 
insolvent enterprises on sale yet. An investment contest is technically very 
difficult and time consuming: this explains its relative lack of popularity. In 
contrast, the buy-out of earlier leased property is very popular since, back in 1990, 
a large number of retail and even wholesale trade enterprises became leased 
companies. 
The parties permitted to enter auctions and contests are: 
- physical entities-residents7; 
- legal entities-residents8, if government share in their property does 
not exceed 25%; 
- any foreign investors if' there is consent from the local Soviet 
(Council). 
In general, new owners are not burdened with legal handicaps, but they 
simultaneously receive little guaranteed benefits. Only in some special cases, as 
employee buy-outs, are there some regulated privileges for buyers. According to 
the law, the employees are required to pay only 20% of the clearing price 
immediately and the rest on a three year installment basis negotiated by the 
parties upon sale. They also get a 30% reduction in the price of the lease which is 
deducted from the eventual selling price. 
If auctioned property belonged to local authorities (the most prevalent case), 
almost all proceeds go to the local budget with two exceptions: 4.5% of gross 
receipts are collected by the Committee for the Management of State Property and 
another 10% go to  the federal budget. 
Russian and foreign banks are free to finance would be investors, but they 
cannot use the Central Bank of Russia credits for such purposes. 
' Although the status of citizens from other Republics of the former Soviet Union remains unclear; 
in most cases, they are allowed to participate by default. 
8 Again, the status of the residents of former Soviet Republics remains unclear. In small cities 
and in rural areas, these 'foreign' residents normally find it extremely difficult to bid due to the obvious 
social and political mnstraints. However, organizations from former Republics of the USSR have 
widespread operations, for example, in the Moscow real estate market. 
3. The Progress of SSP - Major Problems Emerging: in the Process of 
- 
SSP and Thereafter 
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
Privatization of the retail network began 1 January 1991'. Small-scale 
privatization coincided with the start of economic deregulation. As of the 
beginning of 1991, retail stores had no central orders to l lf i l l  regarding sales or 
supplies as directed from the state or local governments. Very few of the large 
state retail enterprises were under ministerial jurisdiction by this time, most were 
under local or regional authority. From this point onward, prices, inventories, and 
sales policies were solely the responsibility of the individual retail outlets. 
Originally, the SSP in the CSFR was a grand scale and fast program of 
privatization. Approximately 100,000 to 120,000 units were to be privatized in a 
short period of time, but in the middle of the period assigned for the SSP (in 
October 1991) the Czech Minister of Privatization declared that there would be no 
more that 23,000 units privatized in the program. The cause of this change was 
manyfold. A large amount of the shops and services were not capable to be offered 
for small scale privatization because of the condition of making them free of 
previous obligations. Many of the shops offered at  auctions did not turn out to be 
as attractive for would be buyers as they were originally conceived. 
Special rules for restitution (a full in-kind compensation of previous owners) 
also hampered the sale of many shops: the deadline for claims regarding previous 
property is the end of 1992 and the highest estimation for the percentage of the 
total number of retail trade shops to be claimed is 40%. According to the principles 
applied here, restitution had priority over SSP. No entity could be singled out for 
privatization if there were any hints of restitution claims on hand or to be 
expected. 
The retail and service outlets that did not find new owners as a consequence 
of SSP (or original owners through restitution) were not to  remain untouched: 
these will either be privatized in the framework of the large-scale privatization 
(now complemented with their obligations) or will be liquidated. 
Even if the original number of units had to be scaled down, the SSP in 
Czechoslovakia was a relatively fast process. In Slovakia for instance over 85% of 
the (scaled down) number of units had been privatized by 21 June 1992, either via 
auction (67%) or as part of the restitution program (18%). If numerous retail 
stores under the authority of communities or cities are included, the percentage 
' The network consisted of approximately 8,000 retail shops: 4,500 food, 3,000 non-food, and the 
rest were big department stores and mixed shops. 
is even higher. At any rate, the SSP process by auction should be completed by 
30 June 1992. 
Small-scale privatization has contributed to and stimulated the emergence 
of the private sector. The importance of this sector in the whole economy has 
expanded dramatically. In Slovakia, the share of private sector sales revenue 
quadrupled during 1991 and reached 46% of total volume in the first quarter of 
1992. Slovakia has gone from having virtually no private sector in 1990 to having 
a full-fledged private sector in retail, services, and some manufacturing by June 
1992. 
The structure of ownership after privatization appears to be quite widely 
distributed. Many of the new owners consist of former employees who were 
successful in the bidding competitions. This, however, is not the majority. 
Numerous persons previously outside the retail trade and services sectors have 
become new owners. This has been very favorable for the development of the 
private sector and competition because these new people are thought not suffer 
from decades of enduring existing practices in the business. 
Early in the SSP program, much of the old nomenclatura and many 
enterprise managers attempted to purposely slow the process by not providing 
local privatization commissions with the required statistical basis needed to 
determine an enterprise's privatization fitness. Therefore, guidelines on the 
compulsory provision of enterprise data had to be entrenched in the privatization 
legislation. 
While few have questioned the method of auctions as the most appropriate 
way of privatizing small business, the fairness and efficiency of the 
implementation have oRen been the source of controversy. One sensitive question 
was the hidden participation of foreign capital. Many foreign investors did not 
want to wait until the second round of auctions by leaving the best objects for 
those eligible for the first round. Instead, they participated in the first round as 
silent partners and have thus acquired many units, the number and value of 
which is still unspecified. These illegal actions were facilitated by some loose 
regulations: the buyer did not have to justify the origin of the money (many times 
millions or ten millions of CSK) he paid for the outlet, nor the fact whether the 
source was taxed revenue. Another point of concern was the practice of Dutch- 
clock auctions, where the law could not prevent collusion between the participants 
and accordingly many such auctions were judged as unfavorable by the public. 
Peaks and troughs quite clearly characterized the prices achieved for outlets 
at auctions in the CSFR over the last 18 months. In the early months, growth in 
prices was low due to caution on the part of buyers and the unfamiliarity with 
entrepreneurship. Just as prices were rising, a new decree to set higher starting 
prices caused demand to drop. Prices gained momentum, only to be suppressed 
again by quasi-legal actions of corrupt forces and racketeers. Government 
measures to combat corruption led once again to higher prices, but measures 
regulating the calling prices caused SSP to slow down and gains to decline 
considerably towards the end of the 12 month period. 
Selling prices of the outlets were initially 50% to 60% above the initial 
prices; the average realized selling price being around CSK 1 Million. In 75% of 
the cases, only the right to rent the outlet was sold, and it was mostly these cases 
where selling prices were much higher than the initial ones. 
As for the post-privatization activity of the shops, the first experiences show 
that the supply provided by the privatized units have often diverged from the 
standard selection and supply of goods known in the past. This has created 
particular problems in meeting the demand for industrial products where former 
standards are still the norm. The very rapid dismantling of the retail network to 
many different entrepreneurs has not guaranteed the preservation of the 
distribution system as it was, resulting in a shortage of certain goods. On the 
other hand, the new additions to the selection are usually very similar in most 
non-food retail shops; namely, imported toys, electronics, perfiunes and other 
household chemicals, consumers goods, and so forth. 
Another interesting feature of the renewed activity of retail trade has been 
provoked by restrictive macroeconomic policies leading to a 40 % decline in 
consumer demand. Faced by this critical problem, new dealers eagerly searched 
for products that would secure their level of turnover and found that Western 
imports, no longer limited by import quotas, were more appropriate than products 
produced domestically. As a consequence, the decline in domestic industrial 
activity is partially blamed on the renewed purchasing policy of newly privatized 
retail trade units. 
3.2 Former East Germany 
-
Privatization of retail trade and consumer services in the bygone German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) was among the most rapid in former Eastern Europe. 
The process of small-scale privatization started shortly after the establishment of 
the monetary union with West Germany, midway through 1990. Like in other 
East European nations, privatization coincided with general economic reform. 
In the one and a half years between 1 January 1990 and 30 June 1991, the 
Treuhand had privatized almost 85% of the retail trade and service outlets in its 
SSP program. By the end of 1991 most of the previously state-owned operations 
in trade and consumer services had been privatized. 
Statistical data about the privatization of former 'HO' (state) retail shops, 
restaurants and hotels give evidence of the dynamics of the privatization process. 
Out of the some 30,000 units 9,300 entries were privatized by October 1990 and 
another 24,000 by the end of June 1991. In this second period, two rounds of 
competitive bidding were organized: the first resulting in the sale of 'some 11,400, 
and the second in about 2,600 outlets. The privatization of 60% of the outlets was 
organized by branch offices of the Treuhand while the rest was arranged by the 
head office in Berlin. 
The East German case showed that the centrally planned wholesale sector 
of the old communist days had no future in a privatized retail trade and service 
economy. In fact, in its previous form, this sector became totally useless and was 
completely unprepared to function as a modern distribution system. The Germans 
had two answers; firstly, privatize retail and wholesale essentially simultaneously; 
and secondly, allow Western wholesalers (primarily West German in this case) to 
enter the market. 
Complete opening of the economy to the West, the breakdown of traditional 
markets, the inadequate establishment of a mature entrepreneurial environment, 
and the deficiency of managerial experience to exploit the potential of the re- 
privatized sector lead to not always beneficial changes in economic structure. 
These factors combined with a lack of skills in marketing, purchasing, controlling, 
finance, and technology and capital transfers have led to a sort of colonization of 
the most interesting and economically profitable activity in the East by the West. 
Retail trade was considered as an important field by western investors. 
Therefore, the West German retail trade chains were eager to successfully bid for 
shops in East Germany. The chain Spar bought 2,000 outlets, Edeka 100, Rewe 
200, and Engle 413, while other western retailers preferred green field 
investments (i.e., those required to build a completely new establishment from 
scratch)lO. As a result of this avalanche of Western investment, the 
concentration of retail trade in East Germany still remained very high, certainly 
higher than in the western part of the country. 
The Treuhand followed a policy of encouraging managers of shops under 100 
m2 to buy out their businesses. As a result, 36% per cent of all management buy- 
outs took place in the trade and service sector. Experts predict, however, that a 
lack of proficiency and financial power on the part of the new owners may force 
these shops to soon close in light of the competition provoked by the powedul, 
giant chains. These financially solid and aggressive firms show an active 
investment policy in the ' N e u  Under', and use every tool (like the way the 
i&astructure is reconstructed) to reshape consumer purchasing habits. A 
characteristic example is the construction of big supermarkets and department 
stores along the highway surrounding Berlin. 
In addition to management buy-outs, another way of takeover of small and 
medium size business by East German businessmen was the re-privatization of 
those 4,000 firms that had been nationalized by the East German state in 1972. 
Unfortunately, the process of re-privatization did not gain much momentum in the 
last one and a half years. Only 25% to 30% of these enterprises could be taken 
~ ~ ---- - 
lo See Miiller (1991). 
back by their original owners due to the often extensive alterations in the business 
premises and the profile of the activity. 
The third manner in which private initiative could gain ground in the small 
scale sector of East Germany was with the growth of new small business in retail 
trade and catering. The initiative to establish new business was especially 
pervasive in 1991; however, by the middle of 1992, a certain balance was achieved 
between business openings and closures, the former still being twice as high as the 
latter. Statistical numbers also indicate that, as a rule, half of all openings and 
closures takes place in the retail trade and catering sector with the monthly 
openings averaging around 8,000 business units. 
Due to the high initial level of private ownership in retail trade and 
consumer services, the Hungarian SSP was not envisaged as a program for a large 
number of units, but rather for only 10,000. SSP was conceived as a catalyst for 
the progress of ensuing large scale privatization. For both the experts and the 
public did not take much time to learn that the dimensions of the program were 
much smaller than had been originally declared and the implementation was 
extremely slow. 
It turned out that of the 10,000-10,300 outlets that were originally selected 
for pre-privatization, a great number was in cooperative or private ownership and 
accordingly not subject to the SSP law. Another 4,700 operated in leasing or other 
contractual arrangements where the contract did not make it possible to privatize 
the outlet before the expiration of the contract." By April 1992, the property 
rights of only 680 outlets had been sold, while the rights to rent had been sold in 
the case of another 1,980. There were 560 additional shops where the form of 
privatization other than auction was applied (for instance, by converting or 
merging into a company). 
Forty-three per cent of the biddings were unsuccessll and had to be 
repeated. The average sale price was about 140% of the starting price. The 
revenues from SSP, which have reached approximately 8 billion Forints (10 billion 
by August 1992), were to be used mostly to finance past and current national 
budget deficits as well as the costs of privatization. 
11 According to a new law, introduced on 29 August, 1992, renters of these 4,700 outlets will have 
a 45 days period to apply for the purchase of the shop they currently rent. They will have the 
opportunity to buy it without auction at the book value of the premises or at the starting price of a 
fictitious auction. 
The Hungarian SSP process was also contaminated by some circles that 
attempted to manipulate auctions, particularly if the starting price was perceived 
to be too high. This caused variations in selling prices. However, the 
implementation of the simplified auction under the SSP law facilitated an official 
reduction of the starting price. Consternation that others could subsequently 
afford the particular outlet, forced the potential manipulators to bid more seriously 
in the first round of auctioning in response to this disciplining mechanism. 
While the eventual number of shops offered for SSP turned out to  be low, 
the number of unsuccessful auctions was relatively high. This lack of interest on 
the side of Hungarian would-be entrepreneurs could be explained by two factors. 
The first is that too few outlets were offered for outright sale of premises and too 
many for selling the right for rent only. Hungarian citizens were reluctant to bid 
for outlets where they could buy the right for rent only, because no regulation 
guaranteed them the possibility to achieve an acceptable rent for the medium term 
in their negotiation with the owners, mostly the local authorities. These 
authorities usually forced the new renters to make a new contract containing 
higher, many times two or three times higher, rent than the state owned shop had 
paid in the previous period. 
The other factor was the lack of preferential credits to be used in the SSP. 
In the summer of 1990, the government promised to provide a so-called Existence 
Credit for this purpose, but the Ministry of Finance and the banking system took 
almost one and a half years to precisely elaborate the conditions of this credit. 
Due to the obstacles mentioned above, the new Hungarian entrepreneurial 
class habitually found it more rational and less expensive to start a business from 
scratch rather than buy an existing one via the SSP program. By the end of 1991, 
about 150,000 private retail traders were registered (half of them emerged in 
1991) as opposed to the 3,000 outlets sold in the framework of the SSP. 
Unfortunately, this turn away from existing premises has begun to reduce the 
average level of quality, selection, and service of these often just single-person 
enterprises because their location and facilities are often inferior to those of the 
existing shops. 
In addition, SSP played a limited role in transforming the Hungarian retail 
trade sector. In contrast to the privatization of the existing retail trade, the selling 
of large trade networks in one piece (not under the force of SSP), played a larger 
role than the SSP itself. The 3,000 outlets, which were privatized in SSP, 
constituted less than 12% of the existing state outlets in 1988. 
One of the major controversies concerning the privatization of Hungarian 
retail trade was whether large retail trade chains should be privatized in one piece 
- in the framework of invited or advertised bidding, through negotiations with the 
SPA - or by units within the framework of the pre-privatization program. As 
mentioned above, many networks made themselves already inaccessible for SSP 
by steps undertaken in the phase of the spontaneous privatization (for instance 
by their transformation to joint ventures with foreign participation). Additionally, 
the SPA'S insistence on achieving the highest revenue from privatization rendered 
many networks of specialized retail trade outlets, department stores, and hotels 
offered for sale in one piece and consequently mostly sold to foreign investors. As 
a whole, each individual piece usually proved to be too expensive for domestic 
buyers. 
Newly privatized retail trade businesses in Hungary had to face a market 
fidl of new difficulties on the one hand, and a market showing certain signs of 
improvement on the other. 
In the last two years, restrictive macroeconomic policies of the government 
caused consumer demand to decline by an annual 15%. Retail trade had to cope 
with the massive shrinkage of the market. 
Simultaneously, however, the access of the trade sector to products they can 
sell improved dramatically. The cause of this was partly the progress of the 
liberalization of imports and partly sales problems of Hungarian producers in 
Eastern Europe. Upon loosing their potential markets in Eastern Europe, these 
producers were forced to court domestic retail traders in order to persuade them 
to select their products for sale. This turn of events helped retailers to attain a 
more balanced position vis-&+is the wholesale enterprises12. 
The short term experiences with retail chains taken over by foreign 
investors are not unambiguously favorable. Some of the new owners did not make 
any modification to the supply or service of the old shops, but changed the name 
of the network and adjusted the prices upwards. Others introduced a selection of 
high-end products which masses of Hungarian consumers, suffering from the 
effects of current recession, could not afford to buy. A number of the new owners 
of these networks showed a surprising insensitivity for the actual demand of 
Hungarian consumers. They seemed to be less interested in making money in 
their new business and more satisfied with having gained control over valuable 
premises in the best places of the Hungarian capital. 
As for the quantitative description of the behavior of newly privatized small 
scale retail trade business, we may summarize here some findings of a recent 
survey conducted by the KOPINT-DATORG Institute for Economic and Market 
Research and Informatics, BudapestI3. 
The owners/renters of newly privatized units exhibited rather dynamic 
activity. More than 57% of the respondents made investments in their shop and 
l2 Privatization of wholesale companies has started; they will be privatized outside the framework 
of SSP. 
l3 The source of this information as of many other aspects of SSP in Hungary summarized above 
is Palbcz (1992). 
more than 50% planned to undertake significant changes (investments) in the near 
future. Almost one third of the new ownerdrenters changed the profile of the shop: 
57% of them has broadened the profile while only a very few narrowed it. 
About two-thirds of the entrepreneurs bought an outlet using credit. The 
300 respondents to the survey on the progress of SSP raised loans from 14 
different banks. 
The majority of the new ownerdrenters use standard suppliers, mostly the 
traditional, state owned wholesale trade companies. This seems to be a special 
feature of the pre-privatized small shops since, in the other sectors of retail trade, 
experiences show that a growing number of the firms try to bypass wholesale 
traders and use direct purchase &om producers or from import. 
About half of the respondents revealed that the newly privatized shop was 
not hidher f i s t  venture, and 40% of them still operate one or more additional 
businesses. This feature indicates that those having participated in the SSP were 
not without previous experience, a massive part of them joined the entrepreneurial 
sector during the eighties. In fact, to buy a shop in Hungary for some million 
Hungarian forints (even with credit) is a risky venture and it would have been 
even more risky for people with absolutely no previous experience. 
3.4 Poland 
After the elections of the new municipal authorities, these new 
administrative bodies embarked on a vigorous privatization of the outlets under 
their control. 
The Polish population has been identified as always having sufficient funds 
a t  their disposal to start small business. Also, tax holidays were granted for small 
business during this time. As a result, municipalities saw a chance to gain much 
revenue by a fast privatization of retail trade outlets in face of the strong demand. 
Due to a deficiency of detailed regulations other than some general 
guidelines from the central government, each of the municipal authorities were 
permitted to independently devise rules of behavior for this purpose. The outcome 
was a variety of methods for allocating rental contracts for the premises. 
The outright sale of the retail premises were perceived as less favorable 
under the existing conditions. The legal status of the outlets were too 
unintelligible for accomplishing a 111 transfer of property rights. Yet, even if this 
could have been solved, the municipalities themselves preferred a continuing flow 
of budgetary revenues rather than a lump-sum payment for a sale, and also 
preferred the maintenance of their power as the owners and administrators 
preserved under rental agreements. Even a modification in the civil code in 
October 1990 to enhance the outright sale of various kinds of premises did not 
lead to a substantial rise in outright sales: only 3% of the units privatized were 
actually sold by the end of 1991, while the remainder was rented. 
The methods of allocating the rental contracts varied from the more 
administrative, but unclear approach to the less discriminatory, most transparent 
market technique. Some authorities opted for an organization where contracts 
were drawn up with previous employees or agents having had a relation to the 
earlier business operation of the outlet (i.e., with insiders) excluding all other 
parties, and agreed on a notional, low rental fee. Others organized tenders but for 
a restricted group of possible buyers only. Another group of authorities preferred 
the open advertisement of auctions for everybody, and either gave preferential 
treatment for insiders, or granted equal treatment to anyone expressing interest. 
The variety of the methods used by municipalities is well reflected in the fact that 
the employees of retail outlets were treated differently in different districts within 
Warsaw. 
Despite the great variety of methods, privatization was biased toward 
administrative allocation of renting rights versus allocation through the market. 
While in Czechoslovakia and Hungary the application of open auctions was a rule, 
in Poland they were exceptions. Out of the 43,000 rental agreements concluded 
within the framework of SSP, only 4% were completed through unrestricted, open 
auctions by June 1991. 
Municipalities showed a clear preference for insiders in the allocation of 
rental agreements. This bias has been achieved partly by various forms of 
pressure of the groups of insiders: they demanded favorable treatment, low rental 
fees, were extremely well organized, and supported by trade unions. The 
administrative allocation, favoring insiders also resulted in rental fees that were 
usually much lower than the fees achieved through open auctions (the latter were 
10 to 100 times higher than the former). This fact explains why closed allocation 
of rental deals were so vulnerable to corruption and other negative aspects. 
Municipalities were not regulated by prescriptions of the center. However, 
as a consequence of their similar thinking and vested interests, they tended to  
issue similar resolutions concerning SSP. For instance, many municipalities 
imposed two conditions on the insiders with whom they intended to  make a 
contract. First, the insiders had to form a partnership or limited liability company 
comprising all the existing employees or at least 50% of them and, second, insiders 
applying for the rental agreement had to be employees in the given outlet for a 
predetermined period of time (this latter condition served to exclude influential 
outsiders, like old nomenclatura, from the preferences granted to insiders). 
While the new municipalities were totally unprepared for the tasks required 
for the organization of the SSP, and undoubtedly made errors and even 
transgressions, the pace of small scale privatization in Poland reached a 
remarkable rate. Different sources show different results: Grosfeld-Hare (1991) 
as well as Dabrowski (1991) estimate that 40% to 50% of all shops were privatized 
by the end of 1990, while the Polish Ministry of Privatization (1991) put this ratio 
to 80%. According to government estimates in September 1991 private retail trade 
turnover amounted to 72% of the turnover of the whole retail trade sector14. 
Statistical data, however, indicates another interesting feature of the 
privatization process in Poland. In the year 1990, the number of retail trade 
outlets in Poland increased from 72,000 to 346,000. This explosion of private 
activity clearly cannot be explained only by the privatization of the 30,000 to  
50,000 outlets previously owned by the state. One should be reminded of a similar 
characteristic feature as in the case of Hungary: the establishment of new 
businesses from scratch was more frequent than the conversion of previous state 
owned outlets and played an equally important, if not dominant role, in the 
privatization of economic activity. 
Public acceptance of SSP was mixed, but generally positive. Clearly the 
ownership change in tens of thousands of retail outlets contributed substantially 
to the secular shift in the supply of goods and services in Poland, quickly changing 
the appearance of towns and the perceived quality of everyday life. However the 
implementation of the SSP also raised doubts and caused frustration in the 
population. The imprecise rules of the realization of the process, the absence of 
clear, unified methods of valuation, the inadequate distribution of the information 
concerning the governing rules of privatization and preferences for insiders all 
generated tensions and conflicts. Public discontent emerged both when artificially 
low rents were agreed upon with selected partners in closed negotiations and when 
exorbitant rents were secured in some open auctions for premises in high demand. 
Among the ambiguities of the legal framework one must also mention the 
problem of restitution which unlike in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary has 
not been seriously tackled in Poland. 
When the privatization program for retail trade began, major questions 
arose concerning the state of wholesale trade, as it was still highly monopolized 
in 1990. The retailers had their difficulties with the big state enterprises 
dominating distribution and wholesale. The transformation of the ownership 
pattern in this field remains ambiguous. State wholesale companies lost one-fifth 
of their warehouse space in 1990, most probably through privatization. Private 
entrepreneurs also showed vigor in setting up new wholesale businesses: by the 
end of 1990, about 35,000 private businesses were registered as wholesalers or 
mixed retailers and wholesalers. The government also tried to challenge the 
dominance of state wholesale companies by the liberalization of imports and by 
making it free to set up importing businesses. The wholesale sector, however, has 
essentially stayed in the hands of state companies. The main cause was the plan 
to privatize distribution and wholesale enterprises as part of the large-scale 
privatization scheme which made less progress in the first years of the 
l4 Quoted by Tamowicz, et a1 (1992). In compiling this summary of Polish SSP we have relied 
heavily on this remarkable study. 
privatization phase. 
3.5 Russia 
The progress of the small-scale privatization process has been extremely 
unevenly distributed in Russia, some regions far along the path and others not 
even ready to begin the process16. During the early stages, SSP has been 
primarily concentrated in all large Russian cities. Moscow has taken the lead; 
however, some experts allege that this is largely ascribed to  the extremely flexible 
application of SSP guidelines and independent modifications when so desired. 
Small outlets are not being auctioned, but rather given away to the collective of 
their workers or employees (actually, sold at a non-market determined price of 
1,000 rubles per square meter of total space), p r e s e ~ n g  monopoly-style operation 
and leaving the property largely in the hands of the former nomnclatura. Of the 
6,000 shops privatized in Moscow, 70% were disposed in this manner. 
The Moscow 'give-away style' of privatization has been said to  encourage the 
criminal factor. Much capital is supposedly flowing in from the grey economy and 
is subsequently oRen behind employee acquisitions. As a result, the SSP has lost 
some credibility and the receipts from privatization have not been as high as they 
could under more virtuous circumstances. 
Such a custom, aside from its clear advantages (such as facilitating a high 
speed of privatization), leads t o  preservation of the previously and currently highly 
monopolized and corrupted system of retail trade in Moscow. Personnel remaining 
from the previous system, with its old connections to the upstream monopolies, 
good level of social security, and historically high incomes (in kind and in cash 
terms), are confronted with insufficient incentives to  develop their businesses. At 
the same time, the process of creating new small enterprises is much less 
successful in Moscow due to the sigmficant level of corruption among local 
authorities. 
The way privatization has been accomplished in Nizhny reveals a more 
prospective alternative to the Moscow-type privatization. Until today, the weekly 
auctions in Nizhny have proven to be the most fkequented (by sellers and buyers) 
and the most representative in Russia. As of June 15,12 auctions had been held 
at which 120 outlets had been sold. Although these numbers still appear modest, 
they are increasing rapidly and, more importantly, expanding geographically. 
The special features of the auctions in Nizhny are that the items sold in 
90% of the cases have not been the objects themselves, but rather the rights to 
lease for five years with additional rights to buy the outlets at an estimated value 
after the lease is terminated (as of June 12, only 10 units have been sold outright). 
l6 For example, in the Novosibirsk Oblast revenues from SSP have reached an amazing 300 
million Rubles, while in the Omsk Oblast not a single Ruble of privatization has come in yet. 
This arrangement was the result of technical reasons: land is not yet the subject 
of ownership and almost all outlets are located in the ground-floors of bigger 
buildings, the owners of which are yet to be identified. However, in some other 
cities, local authorities have managed to solve this problem in some fashion, 
significantly increasing auction receipts: for instance, in Belgorod, two auctions 
with outright sale were held with an average price of 20 million rubles per grocery 
store - that is 5 to 7 times as much as in Nizhny. 
As mentioned above, early in 1992, a hierarchical structure of privatization 
administration had been set up. In May, this new structure was operationalized 
and a combination of administrative and economic tools implemented via the 
hierarchical decision-making process. The response over just the next 30 days was 
a tripling of the rate of privatization. While earlier the number of privatized 
shops was a t  a mere 55, it rose to 800 by mid June. Of course, the 800 is still a 
very small proportion of the 150,000 retail shops, 70,000 canteens and cafes, and 
30,000 outlets of consumer related services owned by the state throughout the 
country. Most have been well integrated into the large administrative 
organizations of the city and local administrations. They are a part of the 
bureaucratic apparatus and are monopolies with respect to activity andlor location. 
However, these figures do not include 25% of retail and service outlets that 
have traditionally belonged to many enormous vertically integrated industrial 
enterprises. They were originally created for the provision of workers in the 
enterprises. 
As far as prices of the privatized outlets are concerned, they were on 
average 50 to 100 times the original book value of the premises in Nizhny. The 
initial surge of interest reflected by the high prices offered by prospective buyers 
throughout Russia, was followed by what appeared to be a drop in demand for the 
privatized units if the evolution of selling prices is used as an indicator. In April, 
the average selling price was 30 times the calling price at  the auction, in May it 
dropped to 25 times, and by June the difference had declined to 7 times or less. 
This phenomena was not unknown in some Central and East European economies, 
and was generally a function of capital availability, expectations, modifications in 
the regulations, and corruption. 
Throughout Russia, receipts from SSP have grown by a factor of 30 over the 
last three months before June 1992. The buyers, primarily form Nizhny's recently 
emerging commercial sector, readily have the required 3 to 5 million rubles 
available in order to purchase the right to five year leases of grocery stores, barber 
shops or canteens; most of them without binding conditions on the future business 
profile. (According to guidelines set by the Committee for the Management of 
State Property, not more than 40% of the units can be sold on a binding condition 
in urban areas.) 
Employed personnel of outlets posted for auction have played an important 
role in the bidding process. For example, 10 out of the 22 units auctioned on 4 
April in Nizhny were bought by their employees. As mentioned in the previous 
section (2.5), interest of 'internal' investors were enhanced by significant 
advantages. 
The first effects of commercialization and privatization of small scale 
business have become evident: queues have almost disappeared. Nonetheless, 
people are still running all around trying to identify 'the true market price'. 
Equalization of prices is said to just be a question of time. However, the problem 
of supply response has not yet been solved. Most of the upstream industries enjoy 
a monopoly position and still rely on government subsidies and cheap credits. 
More important are the social implications of the privatization program. 
Workers of retail trade and services - once a mighty and spoiled group - became 
as unprotected as everyone else. Local authorities lost their access to  cheap 
subsidized goods: old 'apparatchiks' just like previously privileged retail trade 
workers are also not pleased with the reform16. Regional population, in general, 
does not oppose the SSP. However, few impulsive protests were reported. In 
Nizhny, every auction is accompanied by a few pickets of trade workers, retired 
staff, and the so-called patriots. In general, reform goes well, although, 
unfortunately, two privatization related murders were reported in Moscow. But 
this is still incomparable to the violence which accompanied the reverse process 
in 1917. 
New owners of retail outlets try to shape their own business policy to fight 
consequences of decline in consumer demand due to the current tightening of the 
monetary policy. As a consequence many of the privatized stores do not sell 
staples, but rather opt for luxury products that are also out of the average person's 
price range. 
Consumers often associate privatization with price hikes that are generally 
beyond their financial means, particularly if they are pensioners or the poor. So, 
due to  changes in business profiles and price increases (though they are really the 
function of abolished subsidies), privatization is often related to the introduction 
of difficulties into life, and not solely advantages. This influences the psychology 
towards privatization, and its acceptance by the consumers. 
There are a few general problems facing Russian central and local 
authorities in the process of the small scale privatization. The following is a list 
and explanation of the presently most important issues. 
1. Ownership of premises: 
In a number industrial cities, retail outlets' premises are not just public but 
l6 There is even open opposition of local authorities to reform in places like Voronezh and Koursk 
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rather belong (up to 90% in some areas) to large industrial enterprises1' 
which, already in the process of commercialization, impede the privatization 
of outlets. The enterprises are unwilling to give up the outlets, because they 
would not be able to control supply of consumer goods for their personnel 
and, no less important, they would lose effective potential sources of 
revenues. 
Another problem with respect to ownership is characteristic of outlets 
having been sold to groups of employees. As experiences of the majority of 
shops privatized in Moscow show, the behavior of these units has not 
changed much because a collective of old employees does not have the 
impression of truly being owners. Their shop is a t  the end of the still 
monopolized chain of state goods distribution and no individual employee 
is permitted to do with his individual share in the shop what he/she 
likes18. The true feeling of ownership is only felt once one can do with his 
or her property as he or she so desires. Thus, there has been little or no 
change in quality and selection of goods and services in these shops. In 
contrast, the sale of retail trade or services outlets to new owners result in 
a completely different picture featuring wider selection, polite service, more 
modern sales style, and the feeling that people like to work and work well. 
2. Leftovers of central planning: 
Retail trade outlets now being commercialized and privatized, are still 
lacking working capital, distribution and transportation infrastructure, 
logistics, raw materials and other goods supply, and storing facilities. These 
all belong to their former 'parents', the great regional monopolies of 
retailing -- so-called TORGi. 
In 1990, as much as 30% of these TORGi signed agreements with the 
former Soviet Ministry of Trade (which has successors now) about leasing 
of their property with additional rights to buy it when leases expire. Only 
the court is able to dissolve those agreements, and only in case of serious 
infi-ingements. If TORGi do not violate their agreements, small shops keep 
lacking working capital, transportation means and storing facilities. This 
problem impedes the separation and privatization of potential objects for 
SSP. Many facilities that have broken away from the TORGi empires have 
l7 Even in Nizhny, the pioneer in small scale privatization, there is a conflict between local 
authorities and GAZ - the giant VOLGA car factory - with respect to this issue. The automobile 
producer with all its auxiliary operations possesses more economic clout than all the city's other 
enterprises together, including those under municipal authority. 
l8 Following the traditional and conventional communist~socialist principle, each employee 
received an equal share in an operation, regardless of fairness or effort. Not only has this provided 
plenty of incentive to just stroll along as a free rider, but the employees must now be unanimous in a 
bid to sell their outlet. No individual can sell his or her share. In only 52 cases so far did employees 
actually agree to sell to one single entrepreneur. A very small percentage of the total number of shops 
privatized by transfer to employees. 
preserved their monopoly status regionally and inter-regionally. Thus, the 
problem is not simply solved by breaking up the great monopolies. 
3. Loss-making trade and services in remote rural areas: 
Much of the trade and, especially, services in remote rural regions were 
historically substantially subsidized for an extended period of time. Now, 
under commercialization, they have difficulty to just survive. Although 
economically i t  is inefficient, socially i t  is necessary to maintain them for 
a long time. Without infrastructures, rural areas will k t h e r  deteriorate. 
4. High monopolization of wholesale trade: 
For more than seven decades Russia has had a unified, centralized system 
of storing facilities upon which the retail shops were totally dependent. The 
lack of an adequate infrastructure on the supply side of the privatized retail 
trade and service outlets causes problems for the entire process. The 
viability of the single units is questionable and their operation risky. 
In a number of regions, successful privatization of small retail outlets 
without accompanying privatization of wholesale networks leads to a 
paralysis of retail trade and consumer related services. The newly 
privatized shops are required to find storage facilities, transportation 
means, suppliers and more by themselves; something quite new for someone 
growing up under central distribution systems. Again, back in 1990, 
already 100% of wholesale networks signed agreements with the former 
Soviet Ministry of Trade about leasing of their property with additional 
rights to buy after leasing agreement expires: agreements which only the 
courts can dissolve. 
Vague property rights and bureaucratic procedures: 
Russian SSP, and especially the potential participation of outsiders, is 
additionally still troubled by immature property rights legislation and the 
complete lack of a state program supporting small entrepreneurship. For 
most business activities no license is required, but the new entrepreneur 
must get approval for his or her business profile from his or her future 
competitors -- the still state-owned monopolies. Also, the required 
documents for opening a small business are substantial in number and the 
process considerably onerous, though not necessarily complex. 
6. Current decline in demand for outlets posted in auctions: 
The most recent tendency, along with a rapidly growing number of units 
sold, is a sharp decline in clearing prices and the contraction of demand in 
general1'. This fact is attributed to the current tightening of the monetary 
policy by the Central Bank of Russia. 
l9 In Nizhny, for example, on 4 April 22 outlets have been sold for between 3 and 5 million rubles 
each, and 80 bidders participated. At another auction in late May, 10 outlets were auctioned to only 
20 bidders, and prices were around 1 million rubles apiece. 
The occasionally experienced declining demand in the auctions for outlets 
will experience a durable upswing with the introduction of personal privatization 
accounts and vouchers expected towards the end of this year. These vouchers will 
be introduced by 1 November 1992 in the RFR. The other problems can hardly be 
solved within the next few months and even years. There are some elegant 
solutions; for instance, transformation of TORGi into joint stock companies which 
belong to  their former subsidiaries - the retail trade outletsz0. But these 
solutions require consensus of all parties involved, and, not least, plenty of time. 
4. Conclusions 
-
Small-scale privatization in the last four years has contributed to and 
stimulated the emergence of the private sector in Central East Europe and Russia. 
The importance of this sector in the whole economy has expanded dramatically. 
The share of private sector sales revenue have increased substantially and most 
of the countries have gone fkom having virtually no private sector ten or less years 
ago, to having a Ml-fledged private sector in retail, services, and some 
manufacturing by June 1992. 
In most countries of the region the privatization of state property acted as 
a catalyst in the stimulation of new business, while in some of the countries like 
Hungary and Poland earlier deregulation and longer traditions rendered the 
privatization of existing state owned outlets less important and the establishment 
of new business more sigmficant. Small scale privatization has also been 
responsible for altering the populations perspective and psychological impasse to 
the merits private initiative. 
In addition, the quality of goods and service, the general level of selection 
including imported products, as well as the presentation and style of sale have all 
greatly improved. Partly due to effective macroeconomic policies and partly to a 
more responsive retail trade sector queues have disappeared and there is more to  
buy than people can afford. Everything from opening hours to advertising have 
seen significant changes. The number of shops has increased dramatically, 
convenience has improved in many ways, and competition has been ignited among 
domestic retailers and service people. There is hope that this may reverberate all 
the way through the up-stream supply channels. The populations are becoming 
educated about the fimctions (the advantages and disadvantages) of a market 
economy. 
Some progress has been achieved in establishing and developing an 
entrepreneurial class, as well as in the creation of infrastructure necessary to 
20 There are already precedents of such a kind in Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Volgograd. 
support SSP and the subsequent operation of these new enterprises. Business has 
become much freer relative to the past, though it is not always easy to become an 
entrepreneur and operate a retail or service outlet in the private sector. 
Nevertheless, the establishment of the background of this institutional support is 
lagging well behind the growth of 'privatized business. This feature is partly 
responsible for the hardships newly privatized business must endure early in their 
activity and for failures of just started businesses. 
The progress of the financial sector, including the idkastructure of banks 
and credit institutions, is of crucial importance for a W e r  development of the 
small scale sector. Without massive credit lines under favorable credit conditions, 
the majority of the new entrepreneurs may have to close their new venture before 
their ability for conducting business could have been proven one way or the other. 
Another useful form of support, unfortunately not very often utilized, is a system 
of tax breaks and investment incentives for new entrepreneurs. 
Some SSP programs or their implementation have shown clear preference 
for former employees and/or managers of the outlets targeted for privatization 
(Poland, former East Germany and Russia), while others (like those of the CSFR 
and Hungary) gave equal opportunities for outsiders. The clear, strong and across 
the board preference for the collective of previous employees appears to be 
disadvantageous. If the workers receive the outlet virtually free, there will be too 
little incentive to restructure the business and to rationalize on personnel under 
economic conditions in the transition to a market economy. However, if buying the 
outlet is a substantial investment for them, then the arrangement carries a high 
risk, since they put all their savings and earnings into one enterprise; that is, if 
they have such savings. In other cases, the lack of capital impedes acquisition of 
potential enterprises. 
A characteristic and common feature of SSP in each country is the 
preference for domestic investors, or even the exclusion of foreign ones. It is 
justified that, should these countries embark on a prolonged process of privatizing 
of a dominant share of state owned business, prospective indigenous 
entrepreneurs, lacking the necessary capital to compete with foreign bidders, 
should be secured sufEcient incentives to maintain a fair opportunity for access 
to small scale business. Each country made provisions against foreign 
involvement. One should keep it in hisher mind, however that no provision can 
be complete. The Czechs are seriously concerned that while foreigners were 
excluded from the first wave of auctions for retail trade outlets, it had little effect 
as a major part of this sector is owned by Germans already. In Hungary, the 
exclusion of foreigners from bidding for 3,000 privatized outlets means nothing if 
compared to the more than 100,000 other outlets they can buy either one by one 
or in the form of networks. 
As for the speed of SSP, we have seen very swift programs (CSFR and 
Poland) and a slow one (Hungary). The also rapid German case should be only 
considered in context of its peculiarity (the involvement of West German capital) 
and the speed of Russian SSP cannot yet be measured. Speedy privatization has 
its obvious advantages: a rapid transition from coordination by central planning 
to  trade without any inefficient transitory method of coordination and the 
avoidance of detrimental effects of spontaneous privatization, or absorbing the 
assets of the business. One should be aware of the fact, however, that the faster 
the SSP is, the more complaints can be expected about loss of privatization 
revenues, unclear bidding procedures, and conuption. 
An SSP organized in a short period of time does not mean a completion of 
the process. Guidelines and procedures for a second round of SSP may have to 
soon be formulated, in order to encourage and regulate the outright sale of 
premises after the renting contracts expire and property rights of premises are 
clarified. 
In order to ensure truly brisk SSP, some countries deliberately avoided the 
application of very detailed, intricate regulations. Policy-makers in the CSFR, for 
instance, were much in favor of having only a skeleton of laws and well specified 
institutions to carry out the SSP. Polish regulation was also very loose and 
simple, and also reflected a full trust in the initiatives of local authorities. 
The favorable effects of a quick privatization process can easily be 
eliminated by a tardy privatization of monopolized wholesale trade and/or 
upstream suppliers. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland each tried to 
compensate for the delay in this corresponding privatization by effectively 
deregulating entry to these markets and liberalizing their imports. It remains to 
be seen how the Russian private sector can survive without comparable support 
of trade deregulation and inflow of imports. 
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FOR THE WORKSHOP 
Small Scale Privatization: 
Experiences from Eastern Europe 
IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, 26--28 June 1992 
SESSION 1: The Elaboration of the Program of Small Scale Privatization 
The state of the retail-trade and consumer related services sector before 
privatization begins (subordination to central or local planninglcontrol, level 
of monopolization, occurrence of competition, property-leasing relations in 
the different subsectors of the sector, adaptation to changes in demand, 
level of technical development, efficiency); 
The elaboration of the privatization program (political forces pressing for 
fast elaboration; the involvement of central and local government 
administration, different interest groups, enterprise management and 
employees in the elaboration of the program, level of legislation used to set 
up the rules for small scale privatization); 
The planned schedule of privatization and the main organizations involved. 
SESSION 2: Principles and Techniques of Small Scale Privatization 
Restitution and small scale privatization; 
The effect of earlier propertylleasing relations, as well as employee status 
in the ensuing privatization; 
The option of privatizing individual units or chains; 
The option of parallel privatization of the wholesale companies having been 
connected to retail trade; 
The status of foreign capital in small scale privatization; 
Binding conditions in the line of business for the future operation of the 
units; 
The use of revenue &om privatization; 
• Major form of privatization: outright sale, leasing, sale of the use of 
premises for a fixed period of time; 
• The assessment of the initial value of the units; 
The organization of competitive bidding; 
• The methods of financing the purchase of small shops (preferential credits, 
installments, notes of restitution, etc.); 
• Other preferences or advantages provided for the new owners of small scale 
business units; 
• The distribution of power (responsibilities) between central government and 
local authorities in the implementation of privatization. 
SESSION 3: Implementation of the Plan for Small Scale Privatization: 
Problems and Dilemmas 
• Unlawful practices: corruption, paying for withdrawal, fake bidding, 
disguised involvement of foreign capital, mafia takeover. Their occurrence, 
prevention attempts; 
• Unsuccessful auctions, forced devaluation of assets; 
• Unwillingness of local authorities to  supply the expected number of units 
for privatization; 
• Unwillingness on the part of financial organizations to provide the needed 
preferential credits for small scale privatization; 
• Opposition of the public to the sale of business units without binding in the 
line of the future operation of the business; 
• Conflicts between central government and local authorities. 
SESSION 4: The Present State of the Small Scale Sector and the Behavior 
of Privatized Units 
• The progress until now in the small scale privatization program, future time 
schedule; 
• Changes in the line of business f i r  privatization; 
• Changes in the suppliers of retail trade units (preference for imports or 
other new suppliers); 
• Changes in the methods and quality of service after privatization; 
• Investment activity f i r  privatization; 
• The frequency and major causes of bankruptcies of newly privatized 
business units; 
• Present state of the market (ownership relations, level of monopolization, 
occurrence of competition, growing and declining lines of business). 
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